Thoughts on “the Knowledge Argument” as an objection to the view that all facts are ‘book-learning’ facts
Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is usually interpreted as an objection to the physicalists’ view of the world. However, on perhaps less controversial interpretations, the knowledge argument can also be treated as an objection to the view that all facts are “book-learning” facts – knowledge that one could learn without the need for experience or position in the world. This essay first presents the knowledge argument in such a way that it showcases such an objection. Then, the essay elaborates on the argument by distinguishing two types of facts and entertaining possible counterarguments. Finally, the essay would conclude that the knowledge argument has indeed convinced us that not all facts are “book-learning” facts.
In his argument, Jackson (1982) asks us to imagine Mary, an outstanding neuroscientist, who has spent her entire life locked inside a black-and-white room. Mary’s only access to the external world is via black-and-white TV and computers. Nonetheless, she manages to learn everything there is to learn about the world. In particular, she studied all the “book-learning” facts about the colour red. Then, she steps outside the room and sees redness for the first time. The critical question then, is whether Mary learned anything new upon witnessing redness. If we believe so, then the following argument can be formulated:
1. Mary knows all the book-learning facts about the colour red (Premise)
2. All facts are book-learning facts (Assumption)
3. Mary knows all the facts about the colour red. (MP,1,2)
4. If Mary learns something new about object A at time t, then she did not know all the facts about object A at time t-1. (Definition of having all knowledge)
5. When she sees red for the first time, she learns something new. (our assumption)
6. She does not know all the facts about the colour red. (MP, 4,5)
7. Hence, not all facts are book-learning facts. (Reductio, 2-6)
Hence, it seems that the knowledge argument in this form indeed tells us that not all facts are “book-learnable” ones.
It is crucial to note that the validity of this argument rests on our assumption that Mary learns something new once outside the room (line 5). The assumed correctness of this assumption is based upon an almost subconscious distinction between two types of facts:
Type 1: propositional facts of “know that”. For example, the wavelengths of red.
Type 2: experiential facts of “know-how”. For example, the “feeling” upon seeing red
In context, line 5 implies that Mary learns a new type 2 fact about the colour red upon seeing it. This conclusion seems to be in line with our everyday experience of “feelings” upon seeing different colours. Hence, it might be fair to believe that these emotions are not book-learnable, as they require actual experiences of interacting with the colour.
However, some might argue that Mary did not learn anything new. The experience of seeing red is merely a repetition of an old fact she already knew, albeit presented in a different form. If true, this would topple line 5, and consequently, the entire argument.
Conscious ‘feelings’ upon seeing red are fundamentally physical events by the materialists’ account. They are merely the firings of some neurons (Dennett, 1991). Once Mary learns all the possible neuron firing patterns associated with seeing red, she has effectively learned what the feeling of “seeing red” is. Hence, there is nothing new to be learnt.
This view seems to suggest we can learn “feelings” by simply reading words, which is contradictory to most people’s daily beliefs. To reconcile the apparent disconnect between this view and our common-sensical understanding of “feelings”, Conee set forth an acquaintance argument (Conee, 1994). Central to Conee’s acquaintance argument is that these “feelings” or “qualia” (Q), are physical properties of experiences. Mary knows all about Q but has not been “acquainted” with Q during her confinement. Upon release, all that happens is she gets “acquainted” with Q rather than acquiring any new knowledge.
However, even if we think of the new “experience” as a process of acquainting with some old knowledge of neuron patterns, the problem of whether they are entirely “book-learnable” remains. For some people, seeing red invokes a feeling of passion because they used to participate in a protest where they waved red flags. For some people, red reminds them of blood from a previous injury and hence instil a sense of fear. Granted, given the above arguments, Mary can indeed learn all these possibilities and know what “passion” or “fear” feels like in terms of neuron firings. But there remains one thing she cannot learn without prior personal experience or position in the world, that is “which type of feeling would she feel upon seeing red”. Let us suppose that Mary feels more passion than fear upon seeing red. These feelings might indeed be manifestations of “old facts” she already knew. However, the fact that she would feel more passion than fear is new to her. It is absurd to think that she could have “predicted” what her actual feeling would be out of millions of possibilities, as she had no prior social experience with redness. It is also not adequate to think she would not feel anything given she had no experience, as we observe babies with no social experience are naturally drawn to some colours than others. Even if she does not feel anything, this lack of feeling is also a new fact, which is only revealed to her upon actually interacting with redness.
In conclusion, for the knowledge argument to successfully object that all facts are “book-learnable”, we need to ensure that Mary indeed learns something new once outside the room. As illustrated, even though materialists could claim feelings are physical phenomenon and thus “book-learnable” as neuron patterns, real-world experience is needed for Mary to reveal which exact pattern she would experience each time she sees red. Hence, there is something new for Mary to learn through the experience of seeing red, and consequently, knowledge argument has shown not all facts are book-learning facts.
References
Conee, E. (1994). Phenomenal knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 136-150. doi:10.1080/00048409412345971
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown and Co.